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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 On this appeal we must consider whether the 
government’s grant of use and derivative use immunity (use-fruits 
  
 
 2 
immunity) to the spouse of a witness is sufficient to defeat the 
witness’s privilege against adverse spousal testimony.  This is a 
question of first impression for this court in the context in 
which it is presented. 
 I. 
 A witness before a grand jury who asserted her 
privilege not to testify as a witness against her husband in a 
criminal proceeding appeals from the contempt order entered by 
the district court.  The witness is the wife of John Doe 2, who 
is not the target but is a subject of a grand jury investigation. 
 In order to secure the testimony of the spouse-witness, 
whom it had subpoenaed, the district court, at the request of the 
government, granted the witness personal immunity under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 6002 and 6003.  The witness appeared before the grand jury and 
answered only preliminary questions, refusing to answer the bulk 
of the questions, and invoked the adverse spousal testimonial 
privilege.  That day the grand jury issued a subpoena duces tecum 
requiring the witness to provide tapes of conversations between 
the witness’s husband and others which she illegally recorded.1  
Nonetheless, the witness again asserted her spousal testimonial 
privilege before the grand jury and refused to answer various 
questions on the ground that to do so would force her to be a 
witness against her husband in a criminal proceeding. 
                     
     
1
 All parties agree that these recordings are “testimony” 
and are subject to the adverse spousal testimonial privilege.  
The non-witness spouse and the grand jury target have also moved 
to quash the subpoena duces tecum on different grounds.  Their 
motions are the subject of a separate appeal in a related case in 
this court, In re Grand Jury, No. 97-7016/17, which has been 
decided in an opinion issued contemporaneously with this one. 
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 The matter came to issue when the witness filed a 
motion to quash the subpoena on the basis of the privilege.  On 
the same day, the government filed a motion to compel the 
witness’s testimony and supplied an affidavit by the Assistant 
United States Attorney in charge of the grand jury investigation 
in which he promised the witness that the government would give 
use-fruits immunity to her husband in exchange for her testimony. 
 Specifically, the government promised that it would “not use the 
testimony of [the witness spouse] or the fruits thereof in any 
way, either directly or indirectly, in any criminal proceeding 
against her husband . . . [and] the United States will not 
present to this grand jury an indictment in which [her husband] 
is named as a defendant.”  App. at 50.  The government also 
represented in papers filed with the court that “in the event 
that a separate grand jury indicted [the husband], the government 
would bear the burden of establishing that the evidence it used 
to indict [the husband] and the evidence it would use at [the 
husband’s] trial were derived from legitimate sources wholly 
independent of [the witness’s] testimony and production of the 
tapes.”  App. 59. 
 In support of its motion, the government argued that 
immunizing the witness’s husband from any adverse effects of her 
testimony necessarily made inapplicable the asserted privilege. 
The district court denied the motion to quash and granted the 
government’s motion to compel the witness’s testimony, with the 
exception of answers or material that would reveal confidential 
attorney-client or marital communications.  As to the spousal 
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privilege, the court agreed that the government’s promise not to 
use the testimony against the husband sufficiently insulated the 
witness’s spouse so as to overcome the spousal privilege.  
 The witness appeared before the grand jury the next day 
but still refused to testify or produce the subpoenaed material, 
asserting her privilege against adverse spousal testimony and her 
marital communications privilege.  The parties stipulated to the 
record, and the district court found the witness to be in 
contempt, but stayed imposition of sanctions pending this appeal. 
 II. 
 Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides, in 
relevant part, that:  
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the 
United States or provided by Act of Congress 
or in the rules proscribed by the Supreme 
Court pursuant to statutory authority, the 
privilege of a witness  
 . . . shall be governed by the principles of the 
  common law as they may be interpreted by the courts  
 of the United States in the light of reason and  
 experience. 
 
 Federal courts have recognized two kinds of marital privilege: the 
privilege that protects confidential marital communications and 
the privilege that protects a witness from testifying against 
his/her spouse.  It is only the latter privilege that is now 
before this court. 
 It is, we note at the outset, a privilege that has been 
sharply criticized by the Supreme Court of the United States.  In 
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980), the Court quoted 
Professor Wigmore’s statement that the privilege against adverse 
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spousal testimony is “‘the merest anachronism in legal theory and 
an indefensible obstruction to truth in practice.’”  Id. at 44-
45.  Noting that “[n]o other testimonial privilege sweeps so 
broadly,” id. at 51, the Court cited its authority to use 
“‘reason and experience,’” id. at 46 (quoting Fed. Rule Evid. 
501), to “‘develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis,’” 
id. at 46 (quoting 120 Cong. Rec. 40891 (1974) (statement of Rep. 
Hungate)).  The Court explained that unlike the marital 
communications privilege which protects private communications, 
the spousal privilege seeks “to exclude evidence of criminal acts 
and of communications made in the presence of third persons” in 
order to preserve marital harmony.  Id. at 51. 
 The specific question in Trammel was whether a criminal  
defendant may invoke the privilege against adverse spousal 
testimony so as to exclude the voluntary testimony of his wife.  
In the course of its “all-but-unanimous opinion,” id. at 53 
(Stewart, J., concurring), the Court stated that “[t]he ancient 
foundations for so sweeping a privilege have long since 
disappeared,” id. at 52.  It analyzed “whether the privilege 
against adverse spousal testimony promotes sufficiently important 
interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence in the 
administration of criminal justice.”  Id.  Rather than follow the 
action of many states and abolish the privilege in its entirety 
in favor of a privilege for confidential marital communications, 
which had been recommended by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the Court limited its 
holding to the issue before it - the right of one spouse to use 
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the privilege to prevent testimony by a willing spouse. 
 The Trammel Court held that only the witness spouse, 
not the non-witness spouse, could invoke the privilege against 
adverse spousal testimony.  See id. at 53.  Although the issue 
presented here is different, since at this time the witness 
spouse is not willing to provide the testimony, the Supreme 
Court’s discussion in Trammel informs our analysis. 
 The district court here relied on the government’s 
promise of use-fruits immunity in holding that the non-witness 
spouse would be adequately insulated from the effects of the 
witness spouse’s testimony.  The witness argues on appeal that 
because the mere utterance of her testimony, regardless of the 
criminal consequences, would adversely affect marital harmony, 
the government’s promise not to use her testimony against her 
husband is insufficient to overcome the spousal testimonial 
privilege.  She asserts that the privilege involves “a basic 
right to refuse to provide testimony that implicates [a spouse].” 
 Appellant’s Reply brief at 2.  Citing Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53, 
the witness argues that “with the adverse spousal testimony 
privilege, it is not disclosure of communications that is 
protected but rather the impact of the testimony on the 
marriage.”  Id. at 3.  
 This court has never suggested that the privilege is so 
broad as to protect any testimony at all by a spouse.  For 
example, in United States v. Fields, 458 F.2d 1194, 1199 (3d Cir. 
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 927 (1973), the witness-spouse was 
called to testify by a co-defendant of her husband.  Both 
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defendants were convicted.  On appeal, we rejected the non-
witness spouse’s contention that the trial court committed 
reversible error by permitting his spouse’s testimony.  We 
explained that the spousal testimonial privilege did not prevent 
a spouse from testifying at a trial in which her spouse was one 
of two defendants.  Although the trial court should have severed 
the defendant husband, it was harmless error as her testimony was 
not adverse to her spouse.  See also United States v. George, 444 
F.2d 310, 313-14 (6th Cir. 1971) (witness could not claim adverse 
spousal testimonial privilege to avoid testifying before a grand 
jury investigating conspiracy involving gambling information 
merely because his wife, who was not involved in the conspiracy, 
had filed joint income tax returns with him).  
 Nor are we persuaded by the witness’s argument in this 
case that she can assert the privilege despite the promise of 
use-fruits immunity.  The grant by the government of use-fruits 
immunity is a well-established prosecutorial tool to compel 
testimony that is otherwise privileged.  Although the 
constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is the most 
important of privileges and “reflects a complex of our 
fundamental values and aspirations, and marks an important 
advance in the development of our liberty,” Kastigar v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972), the Supreme Court in Kastigar 
allowed grants of use-fruits immunity to obviate the Fifth 
Amendment privilege.  Id. at 448.  The Court explained that 
grants of immunity “seek a rational accommodation between the 
imperatives of the privilege and the legitimate demands of 
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government to compel citizens to testify.”  Id. at 446. 
 Kastigar built upon the earlier holding of the Court in 
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430-31 (1956), where the 
petitioner argued that grants of immunity would not protect his 
privilege against self-incrimination because they could not 
shield him from such adverse consequences as job-loss and 
“general public opprobrium.”  Id.  Rejecting this argument, the 
Ullmann Court explained that the Fifth Amendment only applies 
where a witness is asked “to give testimony which may possibly 
expose him to a criminal charge.  But if the criminality has 
already been taken away, the amendment ceases to apply.”  Id. at 
431 (internal quotations omitted).   
 The witness’s argument that her spousal testimonial 
privilege protects the very act of testifying, regardless of 
whether the government could use the information to prosecute her 
husband, overlooks the significance of adversity in determining  
the scope of the privilege.  Courts have consistently recognized 
that the privilege only applies to testimony that is “adverse” to 
the other spouse.  See, e.g., United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 
827 F.2d 424, 431 (9th Cir. 1987)(refusing to recognize the 
spousal privilege where the witness failed to demonstrate that 
the testimony was adverse to her spouse’s penal interests), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 1042 (1988); In re Martenson, 779 F.2d 461, 464 
(8th Cir. 1985)(same); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 664 F.2d 
423, 430 (5th Cir. 1981) (same), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 
(1982).  These cases make clear that the privilege is “not 
available unless the anticipated testimony would in fact be 
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adverse to the non-witness spouse.”  Martenson, 779 at 463 
(internal quotations omitted).   
 We thus hold that once the government grants immunity 
that eliminates the possibility that the testimony will be used 
to prosecute the witness’s spouse, the witness may no longer 
invoke the testimonial privilege.2  This is the position adopted 
by all courts of appeal which have addressed this issue.  In 
United States v. Doe, 478 F.2d 194, 195 (1st Cir. 1973), a 
husband and wife were both summoned to appear before the grand 
jury in connection with joint criminal activity.  They both 
claimed their Fifth Amendment privilege and were subsequently 
granted immunity.  Each then claimed the spousal testimonial 
privilege, stating that their testimonies would be adverse to the 
other.  The court found no privilege “when both are immunized 
from prosecution and are asked questions about the same 
transaction.”  Id. at 195.   
 In In re Snoonian, 502 F.2d 110, 112 (1st Cir. 1974), a 
husband and wife were subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury. 
 The wife refused to testify, asserting her Fifth Amendment 
privilege.  The husband was granted use-fruits immunity to compel 
                     
     
2
  Judge Aldisert does not join in this one sentence of the 
opinion, and adds this concurring statement: “I object to the 
sweep of this statement because it goes beyond the facts in this 
case.  Being an unreconstructed follower of the Roscoe Pound 
tradition that a holding in a case announces a specific legal 
consequence attached to a definite state of facts, I prefer that 
this sentence  read: ‘We thus hold that under the facts of this 
case, in which the government’s specific grant of immunity 
eliminates the possibility that the testimony will be used to 
prosecute the witness’s spouse, the witness may no longer invoke 
the testimonial privilege’.” 
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his testimony over Fifth Amendment objections but he still 
refused to answer questions, claiming that to compel him to do so 
would violate his spousal testimonial privilege.  The government 
filed an affidavit in which it promised that neither his 
testimony nor its fruits would be used in any way in a proceeding 
against his wife.  Id. at 111-12.  The court held that this 
promise “nullifies any claim of privilege as grounds for [the 
husband’s] refusal to testify.”  Id. at 112.  This decision was 
followed by the Second Circuit in Grand Jury Subpoena of Ford v. 
United States, 756 F.2d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1985), where the court 
held that use-fruits immunity that “is fully co-extensive with 
the scope of the privilege against adverse spousal testimony” 
sufficiently meets the claim of the privilege by the testifying 
spouse. 
 In recognizing that the grant of immunity will defeat 
the adverse spousal testimonial privilege, we merely make 
explicit that which was implicit in our earlier decisions.  In In 
re Grand Jury (Malfitano), 633 F.2d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 1980), we  
upheld the wife’s entitlement to assert her spousal testimonial 
privilege even though both she and her husband were allegedly 
involved in the criminal acts being investigated.  We also 
rejected the government’s argument that because it had promised 
not to use the wife’s testimony in any future proceedings against 
her husband, the wife could no longer claim the privilege.  Id.  
at 279.  We found this limited immunity to be insufficient to 
overcome the spousal privilege since “there is nothing to prevent 
this grand jury from considering the [spouse’s] testimony in 
  
 
 11 
deciding whether to indict.  There is no indication that the 
government intends to . . . ensure that the grand jury does not 
use [the wife’s] testimony against her husband.”  Id.  We 
distinguished the decision in In re Snoonian on the ground that 
in that case “the witness’ spouse was not a target, and the 
government expressly promised that ‘this Grand Jury has no intent 
to prosecute your wife on the basis of your testimony here.’ 
Contrary to the present case, it was clear that the grand jury 
before which the husband would testify would not use his 
testimony to indict his spouse.”  Id. at 280 (quoting Snoonian, 
502 F.2d at 111).  We nonetheless noted that “the [spousal 
testimonial] privilege is not absolute: it does not shield all 
testimony nor does it bar procedures that may protect the spouse 
from the effect of the testimony.”  Id. at 280 n.6.   
 Two years later in In re Grand Jury Matter, 673 F.2d 
688, 689 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, United States v. Doe, 459 U.S. 
1015 (1982), we affirmed the order of the district court denying 
the government’s motion to compel a witness to testify before a 
grand jury after she had asserted her privilege against adverse 
spousal testimony.  The witness had already pled guilty to her 
involvement in the drug operation and her husband was a target of 
the grand jury investigation.  In order to compel her testimony, 
the government initially appeared to promise the witness that it 
would confer on her husband immunity that was coextensive with 
the statutory use and derivative use immunity.  Id. at 690.  
Ultimately, the government promised the witness only that it 
would not present an indictment to that particular grand jury 
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naming her husband as a defendant.  If the wife’s testimony 
implicated a third party who was then willing to testify against 
her husband, the government would impanel a separate grand jury 
to seek her husband’s indictment.  See id. 
  In our analysis of whether this government promise was 
sufficient protection of the spousal testimonial privilege, we 
explained that in Malfitano “[b]y implication we suggested that 
if the Government ‘sever(ed) the husband’s indictment from that 
of the other defendants to ensure that the grand jury does not 
use the appellant’s testimony against her husband,’ the privilege 
might thereby be respected.”  Id. at 692 (quoting Malfitano, 633 
F.2d at 279). 
 However, we found that the government’s promise not to 
present an indictment to this particular grand jury was 
inadequate to preserve the integrity of the privilege against 
adverse spousal testimony because the only change from the 
Malfitano undertaking was that “the impact of the spouse’s 
testimony is delayed,” as the wife’s “testimony is sought with 
the expectation that it may lead to his indictment by a 
subsequent grand jury.”  Id. at 693. 
 In the case before us now, the government makes the 
promise that the witness’s testimony cannot be used directly or 
indirectly in order to indict her husband either before the 
present grand jury or a future grand jury.  This is essentially 
the offer of broad use-fruits immunity that was made and then 
withdrawn in In re Grand Jury Matter.  See id. at 690.  This 
promise is broad enough to overcome the concerns raised in 
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Malfitano that the government not use the spouse’s testimony to 
indict before the existing grand jury, as well as the concerns 
raised in In re Grand Jury Matter that the testimony not be used 
to indict in any future proceeding. 
 The witness asserts that the principal rationale for 
the privilege would be undermined by the very act of testifying, 
regardless of its incriminating impact.  Taking the witness’s 
argument to its logical conclusion, even transactional immunity 
would be insufficient, because the harm to be avoided occurs at 
the moment of the witness’s testimony, regardless of the lack of 
any potential adverse legal consequences to the spouse flowing 
from that testimony. 
 But no court has suggested the privilege sweeps that 
broadly.  Indeed, as we explained in Malfitano, the rationale for 
the privilege is “that it protects the marriage from the discord 
that occurs when one spouse testifies against the other.” 
633 F.2d at 277 (emphasis added); see also Trammel, 445 U.S. at 
44.  With use-fruits immunity, as the government has granted 
here, the witness’s testimony will not have adverse legal 
consequences to her spouse, so the purpose of the privilege is in 
no way undermined. 
 The Supreme Court rejected an argument similar to the 
witness’s in the Fifth Amendment context in Kastigar. There the 
Court explained that the grant of immunity must be coextensive 
with the privilege, but need not be broader.  See Kastigar, 406 
U.S. at 453.  “Transactional immunity, which accords full 
immunity from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled 
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testimony relates, affords the witness considerably broader 
protection than does the Fifth Amendment privilege.  The 
privilege has never been construed to mean that one who invokes 
it cannot subsequently be prosecuted.”  Id.    
 In summary, in the case before us the government 
promised the witness that it would not use her testimony, or the 
fruits thereof, in any criminal proceeding against her husband or 
seek an indictment before the same grand jury before which she 
was testifying.  The government has undertaken the burden of 
showing the independent source of any evidence it uses should it 
subsequently indict the witness’s husband.  This use-fruits 
immunity is sufficient in the Fifth Amendment context to defeat 
the privilege against self-incrimination, see Kastigar, 406 U.S. 
at 453, and we hold that it is equally sufficient to defeat the 
privilege against adverse spousal testimony and to compel the 
witness to testify. 
 III. 
 For the reasons set forth we will affirm the district 
court’s order holding the witness in contempt for refusing to 
answer questions before the grand jury and continuing to assert 
her spousal privilege even though the government had promised 
that it would not use her testimony or the fruits thereof in any 
criminal proceeding against her husband. 
  
 
  
